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THE CIVIL RICO RACKET:
FIGHTING BACK WITH FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11*
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 is a powerful
judicial weapon aimed at curbing frivolous litigation.' To maximize
* The author wishes to thank Professor Edward D. Cavanagh of St. John's University
School of Law for his insightful comments.
1

FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's
address.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argumert for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposedfor any improper purpose, such as to harassor to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriatesanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonableexpenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. (emphasis added to indicate 1983 amendments).
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983) [hereinafter Rule 11 advisory committee note]. The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to
"discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." Id.; see McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
896 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing drafters' main goal as deterrence of frivolous litigation
in federal courts).
Leading commentators have praised Rule 11, including Arthur Miller, one of its draftsmen, who has aptly described Rule 11 as "a useful weapon against unnecessary litigation."
See Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at D8, col. 5. William W.
Schwarzer, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of California, has
commented that "Rule 11 is like any other tool: properly used, it can be very effective." Id.
at D8, col. 1; see Louis, Intercepting and DiscouragingDoubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading,Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1023, 1033, 1052-61 (1989) (describing Rule 11
as part of federal rules' "pretrial interception/discouragement system," aimed at curbing
frivolous pretrial litigation); Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A
Warning to Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 WILLAMEmTE L. REV. 441,
465 (1984) (Rule 11 described as "the centerpiece of judicial control over frivolous litigation") (quoting Figa, Rule 11 as a Litigation Tool, 12 COLo. LAw. 1242, 1242 (1983))).
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its deterrent effect, Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to impose more
stringent standards on both the federal courts and the attorneys
who appear before them.' The stricter standards embraced within
the amended version of Rule 11 enable courts to implement their
sanctioning power with greater frequency and severity.' Rule 11
mandates that a court impose sanctions once a violation is found.
Rule 11 also has its share of critics, who claim it is not an effective deterrent and is
invoked too frequently. See Lewin, supra, at D8, col. 1 ("others say that Rule 11 motions
themselves have become a tool for harassment"). In recent years, the controversy over Rule
11 has focused on the impact and effect of Rule 11, particularly the "satellite" litigation it
stimulates. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1013 (1988). Most
commentators agree, however, that Rule 11 is working just as intended. See Lewin, supra.
3 See Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, 97 F.R.D. at 198-200 (emphasizing deterrent effect of amended Rule 11). Rule 11, as originally enacted in 1938, was found
to be inherently defective and, as a result, proved ineffective in deterring frivolous lawsuits.
See id. at 198. This insufficiency was primarily due to judicial confusion surrounding the
situations which triggered the rule, the professional standard of conduct to which attorneys
were to be held, and the nature of available and appropriate sanctions. Id. "Widespread
concern over frivolous litigation and abusive practices of attorneys led to the amendment in
1983 of Rule 11. . .

."

Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer

Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 181 (1985); see also Note, PlausiblePleadings:Developing Standards
for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv.L. REV. 630, 630 (1987) ("[1983] amendments expand[ed]
judges' authority to impose sanctions"). The language of Rule 11, as amended, was designed
to cure such defects "by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing
[sic] those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." Rule 11 advisory committee note,
supra note 2; see also Schwarzer, supra ("new rule imposes much more specific and extensive obligations on attorneys"). The 1983 amendments impose an affirmative duty on attorneys to conduct "some prefiling inquiry into both the [relevant] facts and the law." Rule 11
advisory committee note, supra note 2. If an attorney or unrepresented party violates the
amended rule, proper sanctions are mandated. Id. at 200. Despite this mandatory language,
"[j]udges ... have broad discretion in choosing the appropriate penalty." Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,14 HoFSTRA L. REv. 499, 501 (1986) (footnote omitted).
For a judicial interpretation of the distinctions between the original version and the
amended version of Rule 11, see Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531, 1536-42 (9th Cir. 1986).
See P. BATisTA, Cwr, RICO PRACTIcE MANUAL § 6.3, at 153-54 (1987); see also Rule
11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, 97 F.R.D. at 198-99 (new language of Rule 11
expected to increase number of violations). The advisory committee emphasized that, under
amended Rule 11, courts should be less reluctant to impose sanctions. See id. at 198; see
also Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 500 (amended rule "aimed at increasing a judge's willingness to hold attorneys accountable for their misconduct by encouraging courts to impose
sanctions").
5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. "[T]he words 'shall impose' in the last sentence [of Rule 11]
focus the court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses."
Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, 97 F.R.D. at 200. In Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987),
the court reasoned that the drafters of the federal rules used the word "shall" to emphasize
"the mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the rule.... Accordingly,
where strictures of the rule have been transgressed, it is incumbent upon the district court
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Despite this obligatory language, some federal courts have been reluctant to impose sanctions under Rule 11 for fear of chilling creative advocacy or encroaching on unsettled or developing areas of
law. 6 This judicial resistance to the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
is particularly prevalent in civil actions brought pursuant to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").7
Recently, in O'Malley v. New York City Transit Authority,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
despite the uncertain state of existing RICO law, a trial court must
impose Rule 11 sanctions when confronted with a baseless civil
RICO claim.9
to fashion proper sanctions." Id. See generally Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal
Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1321 (1986) (discussing mandatory nature of Rule 11 sanctions).
Some commentators have argued that it is not likely courts will consider themselves bound
by the mandatory language of amended Rule 11. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 200
(language of rule does not diminish critical role of judicial discretion).
' See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 530. Some courts have refused to impose sanctions in
accordance with amended Rule ll's mandate, most notably when confronted with complex
legal issues. Id. Such refusal has been seen in cases involving the Equal Access to Justice
Act, see, e.g., Mager v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (D. Colo. 1985) (sanctions denied
because law in "state of flux"); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see, e.g.,
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hess, 594 F. Supp. 273, 282 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(attorney's fees denied because jurisdictional issue in question both "novel" and "difficult");
and personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanctions denied in confusing and complex dispute over personal jurisdiction). Other courts have denied Rule 11 sanctions under the belief that such sanctions might
inhibit innovative legal thinking. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d
1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987) (courts should not punish "arguments for legal evolution"), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 229
(N.D.N.Y.) (court reluctant to render such awards in light of "attendant potentially chilling
effect"), affd sub nom. Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984).
See, e.g., Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court's
denial of Rule 11 sanctions after dismissing RICO claims because complaint involved "areas
of law that were sufficiently hazy"), overruled on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989); Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 823 F.2d
105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (sanctions unwarranted due to unsettled nature of statutory period
underlying civil RICO action). There has been an especially marked hesitation to impose
Rule 11 sanctions in civil RICO cases among the federal district courts of New York. See,
e.g., Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (fact
that defendants could not simultaneously be both "enterprise" and "person" did not warrant Rule 11 sanctions due to complexities of RICO statute); Gramercy 222 Residents Corp.
v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (complexity and unclear status of RICO justified denial of Rule 11 sanctions); Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F.
Supp. 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (issue of Rule 11 sanctions not entertained because state of
authority under civil RICO deemed complex);
8 896 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1990).
9 Id. at 705, 709. In O'Malley, the Transit Authority appealed from a judgment of the
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This Note will explore Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as
an effective means of cleansing the federal dockets of frivolous and
abusive civil RICO actiohs. Part One will examine RICO and the
proliferation of recent private litigation under the Act. Part Two
will discuss the general principles of Rule 11 and the criteria for
determining whether a Rule 11 violation has been committed. Part
Three will provide an analysis of Rule 11 violations in the context
of civil RICO actions and suggest that federal courts adopt the rationale articulated by the Second Circuit in O'Malley. Finally, Part
Four will propose that future baseless civil RICO claims be met
with more severe sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
I.

CIVIL RICO

Twenty years ago, in an effort to combat organized crime,10
Congress enacted RICO.1" Although its title bespeaks criminal acUnited States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denying a motion for
Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 705. The Second Circuit reversed and held that Rule 11 sanctions
were mandated "once a district court finds a complaint to be groundless." Id. The Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for the determination of a proper sanction in
accordance with Rule 11. Id. at 705, 710.
10 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-33
(1970) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990)). The "Statement of Findings and Purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 noted:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id.; see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (RICO "intended to provide new
weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime"); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (RICO's major purpose was "to address the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime"). Although the legislative history indicates that
RICO was aimed at organized crime, the statute is conspicuously void of any precise definition of organized crime or of any requirement of involvement in such activities. See Comment, The Second Circuit Rubs Out Civil RICO: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 59 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 398, 407-08 (1985). G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures at the time the Organized Crime Control Act was
passed, has stated that "[n]othing on the face of... [RICO] suggests a congressional intent
to limit its coverage [to organized criminal activity]." Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction
in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DArE L. REV. 237, 248 (1982) (quoting United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978)). See generally Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980) (in-depth discussion of RICO's legislative history).
11See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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tivity, 12 RICO is much more expansive than its name might suggest. 13 Somewhat of an innovation, RICO aptly has been termed
14
"the most sweeping criminal statute ever passed by Congress,"
encompassing more than forty offenses under one federal umbrella. 5 To supplement this breadth, the United States Supreme
Court adopted a liberal reading of civil RICO in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co.,18 furthering the statute's remedial purposes. 17 Unlike
most criminal statutes, however, RICO attempts to remedy the ill
effects of racketeering activity by providing a broad private cause
of action.1 8 In fact, the popularity of civil RICO can be attributed
to its generous provision for recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962."19
See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 1. The word "RICO" has "sinister undertones"
and "evokes images of shadowy underworld activities, bullet-immunized black limousines,
and heavy-set men eating steaks in ornate restaurants in Brooklyn." Id. It is interesting to
note that the statute's title has been linked to the first Hollywood gangster film, entitled
"Little Caesar," which starred Edward G. Robinson as "Rico," the lead gangster. See Parnes
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also DuVal, A
Trial Lawyer's Guide: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About RICO Before Your
Case was Dismissed, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. Rlv. 291, 293 (1986) (word "racketeer" implies
act aimed at "gangsters, mafioso types, loan sharks, [and] professional arsonists").
13 See DuVal, supra note 12, at 293-95. RICO extends beyond organized crime to cover
a "vast array of fraudulent activity." Id. at 293; see also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation
and Impropriety of JudicialRestrictions, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1101, 1102-03 (1982) (RICO's
broad provisions not expressly limited to organized criminal activity).
14 Atkinson, "RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations,"18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68:
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978); see
also R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (RICO's scope is
breathtaking).
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). Section 1961(1) of RICO defines "racketeering activity" in terms of more than forty state and federal offenses which qualify as requisite "predicate acts." See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1030-31; see also Atkinson, supra note
14 (RICO groups wide array of existing state and federal offenses, creating no new "substantive law").
12

16 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

17 Id. at 497. See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1031-32 (discussing
RICO's liberal construction clause).
"S See Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REv.
827, 828-29 (1987); Comment, Adjudication of Civil RICO Actions-State Courts Get an
Offer They Can't Refuse: Lou v. Belzberg, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 301, 302 n.5 (1988).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1964(c) provides that "[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ... may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. This broad private remedy was modeled after the treble damages provision in the antitrust statutes. See Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988); see also Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 736 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987)
(original RICO statute virtually identical to Clayton Act), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
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Civil RICO has become a profitable business for lawyers over
the past decade.2" The prospect of treble damages combined with
the statute's broad scope have proven irresistible for many attorneys.2 These magnetic qualities, however, make civil RICO inherently prone to abuse.22 Since it has become a matter of standard
practice to add private RICO claims to most civil complaints,23
traditional commercial disputes are often transformed into complicated federal RICO proceedings. 24 As a result, legitimate busiTo state a cause of action under section 1962, a private litigant must allege the commission of two or more predicate acts by a person associated with an "enterprise" engaged in
interstate commerce, which constitute a "pattern of racketeering." See 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1988). In Sedima, the Court outlined the elements needed to state a claim under section
1962(c): "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity."
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted). The terms "enterprise," "racketeering activity,"
and "pattern of racketeering activity" are defined in section 1961. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1988).
20 See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, § 1.3, at 4; Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 12, 1986,
col. 1. Although RICO was promulgated in 1970, civil RICO did not catch the attention of
the legal community until 1980. See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, § 1.3, at 4. While only nine
cases involving civil RICO were reported prior to 1980, see Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO
Task Force, ABA SEC. ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW 55 (March 20, 1985), the eighties
have witnessed a virtual "explosion" of civil RICO. See The Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1985,
at A4, col. 2. In 1988, there were 950 civil RICO cases filed in federal district courts; in 1989,
this number increased to 1225. Telephone interview with Lorraine Briscoe, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division (Mar. 6, 1990).
But see Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
Rav. 55, 77 (suggesting number of civil RICO cases filed in federal courts is exaggerated).
21 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "RICO is out of control not
only because it is so easy to claim grounds for a suit, but because the appeal of treble damages plus legal fees has proved irresistible for plaintiffs and their lawyers." Christian Science
Monitor, supra note 20; see Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591
F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (potential recovery under civil RICO is powerful and
"irresistible temptation"). In fact, one court has questioned whether "any self-respecting
plaintiffs' lawyer [would] omit a RICO charge these days." Papagiannis v. Poutikis, 108
F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See generally Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO)-Securitiesand Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime After
Sedima: What is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity'?, 6 PACE L. REV. 365, 366 (1986)
(liberal remedial provisions frequently sought due to possibility of substantial monetary
award).
22 See Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 838. RICO has been the target of two kinds of
abuse: malicious prosecution and abuse of statutory scope. See id. at 838-48. Many private
businessmen have expressed their concern over the proliferation of civil RICO abuse. See
Hearings on S. 1521 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1985) (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, President, Securities Industries Ass'n). At the time
of the Act's passage, several members of Congress predicted the abuse of civil RICO. See
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4007.
22 See DuVal, supra note 12, at 311.
24

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "RICO began to be used for run-
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nesses, such as corporations, banks, and investment companies, are
frequently the target of civil RICO claims involving predicate acts
of mail, wire, and securities fraud.25
RICO's breadth and diversity is further evidenced by the influx and variety of non-commercial private actions brought within
its provisions.2 6 Through innovative lawyering, civil RICO claims
have centered on a myriad of subjects, including sexual harassment,2 7 the 1986 United States air strike on Libya,2" mismanagement of hazardous waste sites, 29 anti-abortion protest activities," a
parishioner's grievances against her former church, 3 ' a strict products liability suit involving defective infant formula, 2 and a wrongof-the-mill cases of misrepresentation and other alleged frauds committed by otherwise legitimate businesses a few years ago when lawyers discovered the broad wording of the statute and its lure of treble damages, lawyers' fees and court costs." Wall St. J., January 24,
1986, col. 1; see Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1513, 1513 (1983) (civil RICO is routine claim in civil suits, especially securities
actions).
21See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, at 1-2. RICO ironically provides private rights of action
against the very businesses the statute was designed to protect. See Hearings on S.1523
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement of M.
David Hyman, Chairman, RICO Comm. of the Securities Industries Ass'n).
26See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, at 2 (civil RICO has experienced "exotic developments" outside business arena).
27 See Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1483 (6th Cir. 1989). In Puckett, a female employee brought a civil RICO claim against her corporate employer based on
sexual harassment. Id.; see also Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (D. Mass.
1986) (alleged acts of sexual harassment and discrimination may constitute pattern of racketeering under RICO).
28 See Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
2172 (1990). Fifty-five Libyan citizens sued former President Ronald Reagan and England's
[now former] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher under civil RICO to recover damages for
personal injury and property loss resulting from the 1986 air strike. Id. It is interesting to
note that the court subjected the plaintiffs to Rule 11 sanctions since the RICO claim had
"no hope whatsoever of success." Id. at 440.
28 See, e.g., Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., No. C86-0530G
(D. Utah Nov. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
30 See, e.g., Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 373 (D.
Conn. 1989), vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990). In West Hartford, the town sought to
prohibit anti-abortion activists from protesting at a local medical center. Id. The court held
that civil RICO did not provide injunctive relief. Id. at 377-78. But see Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1357 (3d Cir.) (anti-abortion protesters liable
under civil RICO), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 261 (1989).
21 See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135-39
(D. Mass. 1982). In Van Schaick, the plaintiff alleged that an agent of her former church
had fraudulently induced her into becoming a church member in violation of civil RICO. Id.
at 1131. The court held that because no business loss was suffered, the plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action under section 1964(2). Id. at 1137.
22 See Morrison v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 743, 744-45 (D.D.C. 1984). The
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ful discharge action."
As a result of the proliferation of civil RICO in recent years,
fundamental concerns over the statute's scope and underlying policy have surfaced. 4 The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that the application of civil RICO has extended far beyond
the congressional intent to eradicate organized crime's infiltration
into legitimate business." In an effort to curb this expansion, some
courts have attempted to restrict the far-reaching scope of RICO
by requiring either a special "competitive" or "racketeering-type"
injury, or prior criminal activity by the defendant.3 6 Judicial efforts
plaintiff in Morrison sought recovery under RICO for physical injuries sustained from consumption of defective infant formula. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim since there
was no injury to business or property as required under section 1964(c). Id. at 746.
3 See Callan v. State Chem. Mfg., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The Callan
court held that a former employee could not recover treble damages under civil RICO for
mental suffering, loss of self-esteem and confidence, or injury to professional reputation. Id.
" See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, in his
dissent in Sedima, argued that civil RICO improperly encroached on state law and displaced crucial areas of federal law. Id. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice
Marshall, the Court's holding in Sedima would expand the reach of RICO unnecessarily into
the mainstream of legitimate commercial enterprise and subject violators to severe penalties. Id. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Note, Sedima and Bankers Trust: Second Circuit Delivers a Mortal Blow to Private Civil RICO Actions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 909, 911
(1985) (increasing use of civil RICO as private cause of action "accompanied by a growing
judicial discomfort with the broad scope of the treble damages remedy" may destroy civil
RICO remedy).
11 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500 (civil RICO "evolving into something quite different
from the original conception of its enactors").
11 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494-96 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985). In Sedima, the Second Circuit construed the section 1964(c) phrase "by
reason of" as requiring a special racketeering injury. Id. The court defined "injury" as the
kind of behavior RICO was intended to prevent, distinguishing it from the harm caused by
acts of mail and wire fraud. Id. In addition, the Second Circuit interpreted the statute as
requiring prior criminal conduct on the part of the particular defendant. Id. at 500-03. Some
courts have asserted that a "competitive" injury is a prerequisite to recovery under section
1964(c), comparable to the requirement imposed under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Bankers
Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring "competitive"
injury), rev'd, 779 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1985).
Recently, some federal district courts have instituted a new approach to streamlining
their dockets of civil RICO claims: the RICO case statement. See Michaels Bldg. Co. v.
Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 1988). This statement supplements a complaint
and attempts to clarify the specific RICO allegations. See Norris v. Wirtz, 703 F. Supp.
1322, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1989). It is also used to determine whether the RICO claim is sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss. See Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 722 F. Supp. 1472, 1474 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(RICO case statement together with amended complaint stated "colorable" RICO cause of
action). Moreover, courts have utilized the RICO case statement approach to further the
purposes of Rule 11. See R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, No. 85-3263 (E.D. La. May
14, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). As a result, these case statements have aided
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to narrow the scope of civil RICO suits have been largely unsuccessful.37 In Sedima, the Court suggested that the inherent
problems of civil RICO should be resolved by the political process. 38 However, until Congress proposes a workable solution,3 9 it
appears that the federal judiciary is best situated to curb the abusive effects of civil RICO with Rule 11.

II.

FEDERAL RULE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 11

In 1983, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was amended as a
result of its ineffectiveness in preventing abusive litigation practices within the federal courts. 40 Amended Rule 11 embraces higher
standards and strengthens judicial authority4" by requiring that
judges in determining whether or not a reasonable inquiry has been performed as required
by Rule 11, thereby minimizing the possibility of a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See
Schwechter v. Estate of Berger, No. 88-C-2688 (N.D. IMI.Apr. 4, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (RICO case statement ordered to avoid Rule 11 motion).
"' See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500. The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's
requirements of a special racketeering-type injury and prior criminal activity. Id. Further,
courts generally have rejected the concept of "competitive" injury in the context of civil
RICO recovery. See Callan, 584 F. Supp. at 622 (civil RICO not restricted to plaintiffs suffering "competitive" injury). For a general discussion of judicial limitations on the scope of
civil RICO and why they may contravene legislative intent, see Note, supra note 13, at
1105-15.
38 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500. Since RICO's shortcomings are internal, Congress
is in the best position to resolve the problems of civil RICO by legislating corrective measures. Id. at 499; see Note, supra note 13, at 1118-21.
29 See H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). A proposal to reform civil RICO was
introduced to the 101st Congress in June, 1990. See id. The bill, aimed at clarifying the civil
RICO provisions, emphasized that RICO was "an extraordinary civil remedy for certain occurrences of criminal activities and is available only when its use clearly serves the public
interest and provides appropriate deterrence against the repetition of egregious criminal
conduct." Id. § 3. The bill also proposed certain limitations on recovery under section
1964(c), including a specific reference to Rule 11: "If the court determines that a pleading,
motion, or other paper filed . . . is in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court shall impose an appropriate sanction, which may include awarding as
costs expenses incurred, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. § 5. It is asserted that
this proposal would effectively remove the economic incentive for claims which do not fall
into the "egregious" category, while allowing genuinely aggrieved plaintiffs to maintain a
suit under civil RICO.
4' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2. The original
Rule 11 was not a practical deterrent. See id.; see also Comment, supra note 2 (until 1983
amendments, Rule 11 was "impotent"). Rule 11, promulgated in 1938, required all parties to
sign each pleading. See S.M. KASSIN, AN EMPsICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONs 2 (Federal
Judicial Center 1985). The required signature certified that there was "good ground" to
support the contents of the pleading. Id. In addition, former Rule 11 imposed disciplinary
actions upon lawyers only for "willful" violations. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986).
4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983) (indicating pro-
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"the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
. . an appropriate sanction" upon the attorney, the parties, or
both once a violation is found.4 2 This mandatory language places
an affirmative obligation on the courts to impose some sanction
once Rule 11 is offended.43 Thus, while a court must invoke its
sanctioning power when presented with a Rule 11 violation, it still
retains the discretion to determine a sanction which it deems
44
proper under the circumstances.
Amended Rule 11 imposes greater responsibilities upon attorneys and parties by requiring that a "reasonable inquiry" be made
into the factual and legal bases of a "pleading, motion or other
paper" before it is signed.4 5 The signature of an attorney or party
*

posed changes in text to original rule). The impact of Rule 11 "stems as much from the
drafters' decision to 'make the profession aware' of the rule and the obligations it imposes as
it does from the amendments themselves." Nelken, supra note 5, at 1318 (footnote omitted).
The language of amended Rule 11 "is clearly phrased as a directive." See Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987); see also Note, supra note 3, at 630-34 (amended Rule 11 extends judicial authority
and places affirmative duties on attorneys). See generally note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing how 1983 amendments sought to increase rule's overall utility).
4I FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (emphasis added). In the language of amended Rule 11, it "appears clear that so long as a violation is apparent to the court, sanctions are mandatory even
where no adversary has so moved." Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Developing
Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 587, 590 (1987). According to the dictates of the rule,
therefore, a court must sanction the attorney, the client, or both, under the proper circumstances. See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709-10; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1336, at 102-04, 106-09 (1990).
43 See, e.g., O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709 (citing Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 n.7);
see also
Nelken, supra note 5 (violation of rule's certification requirement mandates sanctions).
Under the current Rule 11, a court does not have discretion to conclude that sanctions are
unwarranted and thereby deny them. See Note, supra note 3, at 633 ("amended rule is
stricter because it purports to remove judicial discretion whether to impose sanctions once
the rule is violated").
11 See Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 822 (1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 204 (Rule 11 does not restrict
choice of sanction). Under Rule 11, a district court has authority to select sanctions such as
shifting costs, including attorney's fees, to the offending party. See Cavanagh, supra note 3,
at 513. But cf. Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 & n.7 (remanded Rule 11 case to district court with
precise instructions to include expenses and attorney fees).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2; see also Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM.
L. REV. 433, 477 n.260 (1986) (new Rule 11 increases responsibility of bar members in order
to lessen abusive litigation). Rule 11 makes it explicit that each attorney has an affirmative
obligation to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" into the validity of a pleading before actually
signing it. See Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253. A failure to perform a "reasonable inquiry" will
subject the signer to Rule 11 sanctions. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66
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serves as a certification that the signer has read the paper and performed the necessary legal research and factual investigation required under Rule 11.46 In assessing the reasonableness of an inquiry, courts review the signer's conduct using an objective
standard.47 Consequently, an attorney's subjective good faith will
no longer preclude Rule 11 sanctions; 48 nor will subjective bad
49
faith be required to trigger the imposition of sanctions.
Given the more stringent requirements imposed under Rule
11, courts have a greater opportunity to implement their sanctioning power.5 0 Although a lack of conformity exists in interpreting
JUDICATURE

363, 364 (1983).

In determining whether an inquiry is reasonable within the meaning of Rule 11, the
court may consider numerous factors. See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 706. These considerations
include: time provided for the inquiry; whether the signer relied on the client for factual
information; whether the argument represents a plausible view of the law; and whether the
signer relied on other counsel. See Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, 97 F.R.D.
at 199. Exactly what constitutes a reasonable inquiry is still not well defined by the courts.
See Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look, and Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L.J. 751, 760 (1985). One commentator on Rule 11 has
suggested "bright line rules" that would allow courts to recognize a reasonable inquiry with
greater facility by characterizing the reasonableness of the investigation in terms of "clearly
reasonable" to "clearly unreasonable." See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 536-43.
46 See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 185. A signature of an attorney or party certifies that
the pleading meets the strict standards of amended Rule 11. Id. Since the signer also certifies that he has read the document, he may not properly invoke ignorance of its contents as
a defense to a Rule 11 violation. Id. at 186-87.
47 See Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Note, supra
note 3 (Rule l1's revisions enlarge scope of judicial authority to sanction attorneys who
submit "objectively unreasonable papers"). The standard of review is one of objective "reasonableness under the circumstances." Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, at
198-99. This standard is intended to be stricter than the original "good-faith formula." Id.
Under the new Rule 11 objective test, a pleading may be subject to challenge by the court
even though the signer honestly believed it was well grounded in fact and law when signed.
See Note, supranote 45, at 761. Accordingly, a "pure heart, empty head" will not preclude a
Rule 11 violation. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 186-87. In sum, the signer, whether a
party or attorney, must demonstrate that the inquiry was objectively reasonable at the time
it was signed. See S.M. KASSiN, supra note 40, at 5.
,8 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). The drafters made it perfectly clear that subjective good
faith would no longer pass muster under the revised rule. Id. An attorney is no longer excused from sanctions even if "he personally was unaware of the groundless nature of an
argument or claim." Id.
49 See id. at 253-34; see also Norris, 803 F.2d at 1288 (objective inquiry does not look to
bad faith); Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1536 (sanctions appropriate even where no willful
violation).
60 See Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, 97 F.R.D. at 198-89; see also
Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 513 ("heightened emphasis on sanctions [employed] as a mechanism for deterring abusive litigation tactics").
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and applying amended Rule 11,51 it is clear that sanctions are mandated in the following instances: (1) where a competent attorney
could not have reasonably believed the pleading or motion to be
warranted by present law or supported by the facts after making
the necessary inquiry; (2) where a bad faith argument "for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law" is advanced;5 2
The federal courts are empowered to review the issue of Rule 11 sanctions on appeal.
See, e.g., Norris, 803 F.2d at 1288 n.8 (appellate courts conduct own review to determine if
sanctions mandated); Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 n.7 (Rule 11 broadens "scope of review by
Court of Appeals"). According to the Eastway court, the policy underlying this delegation is
that the appellate courts are "in as good a position to determine" a Rule 11 violation and
should not give deference to the opinion of the court below. Id. In reviewing the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions, appellate courts have traditionally applied a three-tiered analysis. See
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). De novo review has been
used when a legal question exists as to whether the conduct violated Rule 11 as a matter of
law. See City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1989); Zaldivar, 780
F.2d at 728. Where there is a factual dispute concerning the violative conduct, a clearly
erroneous standard has been utilized by reviewing courts. Id. And where the district court's
order of a particular sanction is reviewed, an abuse of discretion standard has typically been
applied since lower courts are accorded broad latitude in selecting sanctions under Rule 11.
See id.; Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The United States
Supreme Court, in addressing the appropriate standard to be applied by appellate courts
when reviewing a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, has determined the standard to be one of deference. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2450-51
(1990). In Cooter, the Court held that "all aspects of a district court's decision in a Rule 11
proceeding" should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 2450 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly rejected the "three-tiered standard of review," which was
set forth in Zaldivar,780 F.2d at 728, and applied consistently by appellate courts reviewing
Rule 11 determinations. See Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 664, 669
n.1 (2d Cir. 1989). In applying the deference standard enunciated by the Court in Cooter, it
is contended that a failure to impose sanctions in the face of a clear Rule 11 violation would
constitute an abuse-of-discretion on the part of the district court.
"1 See S.M. KASSIN, supra note 40, at ix-xi. The Federal Judicial Center conducted a
study of how federal judges interpret and apply amended Rule 11. Id. at ix. The results
indicated a strong lack of consensus among the 292 judges surveyed regarding what conduct
constituted a violation of the rule. Id. Moreover, many judges were inclined to analyze specific conduct under the rule's prior subjective standards of willfulness and bad faith. Id. at
ix-x. The lack of judicial conformity in recognizing a Rule 11 violation has been attributed,
in part, to vague areas of the rule, including the "undefined scope of the prefiling inquiry
requirement" and the precise "standards for determining when a pleading is 'well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.'" Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 516-17.
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see Norris v. Grosvenor Mktg. Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir.
1986). This Rule 11 provision can be broken down into a legal component and a factual
component. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir.
1987). Rule 11 can be violated where the complaint evidences a failure to make a reasonable
inquiry into the factual foundation underlying it. See, e.g., Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs.
S.C. v. Foulke, 633 F. Supp. 156, 158 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (sanctions imposed where RICO complaint erroneously alleged three physicians were employees of medical corporation), aff'd,
844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988). A violation of Rule 11 can also exist when the complaint is
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and (3) where the pleading or motion is asserted for an "improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." s While courts are instructed
to impose Rule 11 sanctions when it is "patently clear" that a
claim had no chance to succeed at the time of filing,54 courts traditionally have ruled in favor of the pleader where the validity of the
5
claim has been doubtful.
III.
A.

RULE 11 AND CivuL RICO

Second Circuit's Approach in O'Malley v. New York City

Transit Authority
Despite the advisory committee note to amended Rule 11 emphasizing that the revised "language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions,"5 many federal courts have
demonstrated a marked resistance to the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions in civil RICO cases.5 7 This judicial reluctance has cenwithout legal foundation, see, e.g., Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy action barred by Supreme Court decision represented lack of reasonable inquiry into
law), or where the allegations evidence an unreasonable argument to extend or modify the
existing law, see, e.g., Heimbaugh v. City & County of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573,
1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (claim that prohibition against playing softball in park violated plaintiffs constitutional rights was unwarranted by existing law and lacked good faith argument
for extension).
11 FED. R. Crv. P. 11. This "improper purpose" clause is aimed at curtailing abusive and
vexatious lawyering. See Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1988), overruled on
other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989). This
clause encompasses actions brought for any improper purpose, including. intentional delay
of proceedings, see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 982 (S.D.
Ala. 1985) (insurer's untimely petition filed to delay trial); harassment of opponent, see, e.g.,
Zaldivar,780 F.2d at 832 ("successive complaints based upon propositions of law previously
rejected may constitute harassment"); and abuse of the judicial process, see, e.g., Silverman
v. Center, 603 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (action barred by doctrine of claim preclusion indicated bad faith and abuse of process).
1, See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
11 See Norris,803 F.2d at 1288; Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254. This construction of Rule 11
"serves to punish only those who would manipulate the federal court system for ends
inimicable to those for which it was created." Id.
11 Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2. The revised language of Rule 11
encourages judges to "detect and punish violations of the certification requirement." C.
WMGHT & A. MLLER, supra note 42, at 101. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying
text (1983 amendments aimed at reducing reluctance of courts in imposing sanctions).
57 See, e.g., Brantley v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 710 F. Supp. 135, 142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(sanctions not imposed where civil RICO complaint made factually misleading allegations
and contained unwarranted misstatements); Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Re-
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tered primarily around the complexity and confusing nature of
civil RICO litigation."8 Nevertheless, as recently articulated by the
Second Circuit in O'Malley, the mere uncertain state of existing
RICO law is not dispositive in determining whether a Rule 11 violation exists.5"
In O'Malley, the plaintiff's RICO claim alleged that his employer, the New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA"), had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing acts of
extortion, mail fraud, and obstruction of justice.6 0 The allegations
of extortion and mail fraud were based on various letters from the
NYCTA to O'Malley that were sent via the mails.6 ' These letters,
which were used in the ordinary course of the defendant's business, were found to be deficient of any extortionate or fraudulent
purpose.6 2 Failing in all respects to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, the complaint was characterized by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York as "perhaps the most 'baseless' RICO claim ever encountered. 6 3 Despite
alty Assocs., 591 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (although plaintiff's complaint contained "factual defects," court refused to impose sanctions); see also Goldsmith & Keith,
supra note 20, at 94 (courts generally hesitant to impose sanctions in RICO cases).
" See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709. In O'Malley, Judge Pratt acknowledged that courts
within the Second Circuit have toiled over the RICO terms "enterprise" and "pattern." Id.
59See id. Although "some aspects of the law under RICO may still be somewhat unclear ... this alone is not a justification for refusing to impose a sanction for... [a] 'baseless' [RICO] complaint." Id.
0 Id. at 705-09. The civil RICO claim, an outgrowth of plaintiff's work-related injury
and subsequent termination of employment from the Transit Authority, alleged predicate
acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1341 (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. section 1951 (extortion)
and 18 U.S.C. section 1503 (obstruction of justice). Id. Also, it should be noted that at the
time the RICO action was initiated, the Workers' Compensation Board had already reinstated the plaintiff and granted him $76,000 in back pay. Id. at 705.
61 Id. at 706-09. O'Malley's RICO claim alleged that five letters sent by employees of
the Transit Authority constituted extortion and a scheme to defraud. Id. However, this correspondence merely consisted of an informal handwritten note from the plaintiff's supervisor, a standard "denial of medical benefits" form, a letter denying sick pay, a termination of
employment letter, and a letter requesting the return of $540 in Workers' Compensation
benefits that was mistakenly paid to the plaintiff during his period of illness. Id.
62 Id. at 707, 708-09. Four of the five letters were typical of those written from an employer to an employee in the ordinary course of business affairs. Id. The district court found
that there was "'no mail fraud or anything which would even remotely resemble mail
fraud."' Id. at 707. On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that if plaintiff's claim were successful, "every employer who sent a similar form letter to an employee in error, could be
subject to a possible RICO suit." Id. at 709.
63 Id. Judge Glasser of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York found
the plaintiff's RICO claim to be "nothing more than 'a simple claim by an employee that he
was wrongfully terminated."' Id. at 705.
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this characterization, the district court declined to grant the defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions because of "subtle nuances
in second circuit learning" concerning civil RICO. 4
Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Pratt held that "[m]ere
lack of clarity in the general state of some areas of RICO law cannot shield every baseless RICO claim from rule 11 sanctions.

'6 5

The court reasoned that following the district court's position
would merely serve to inspire frivolous civil RICO claims "in direct
contravention of both the language and purpose of amended rule
11. " 6 While the Second Circuit's view has yet to be adopted by
other circuits, the O'Malley decision does represent a willingness
on the part of the federal judiciary to deal more aggressively with
meritless private RICO suits. Although not every civil RICO claim
warrants the imposition of sanctions,67 the breadth of civil RICO
and the enhanced standards set forth in amended Rule 11 invite
close judicial scrutiny.68
B. Application of O'Malley to Enumerated Rule 11 Violations
1. The "Frivolous" Civil RICO Claim
While a district court is required to impose sanctions if a complaint is substantively groundless within the meaning of Rule 11,69
some courts have refrained from imposing sanctions in the face of
clearly "frivolous" civil RICO claims.70 An example of this was
demonstrated by the district court's decision in O'Malley, which
64 Id. Interestingly, the district court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact
existed concerning the alleged racketeering activity, and granted summary judgment for the

defendant. Id.
05 Id. at 709. Using a de novo standard of review, the Second Circuit held that plaintiff's civil RICO claim violated Rule 11 as a matter of law. Id.
:a Id.
7 See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 22 (2d Cir.
1990) (Rule 11 sanctions not imposed where civil RICO claim represented plausible interpretation of law).
as See P. BATISTA, supra note 4, at 152-55. The procedural aspects involved in a civil
RICO claim should be analyzed and developed with a sensitivity to Rule 11. Id.
"' See, e.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir.
1987) (failure to make reasonable inquiry into law or facts violates frivolous clause of Rule
11); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing violations of Rule l's frivolous clause).
70 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. But see Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1988) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous civil
RICO action).
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rejected the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions despite finding a Rule
11 violation based on an absence of reasonable inquiry into the
foundation of plaintiff's civil RICO claim.71 This judicial hesitancy
to invoke Rule 11 also was present in Beeman v. Fiester,2 where
the Seventh Circuit was presented with a civil RICO claim clearly
devoid of any factual or legal foundation. 7s Although the frivolous
nature of the private RICO action was apparent from the record,
the Seventh Circuit declined to impose sanctions since the case
74
dealt with "areas of [RICO] law that were sufficiently hazy.
Thus, based on the Second Circuit's holding in O'Malley, it appears that to allow such frivolous claims to go unsanctioned, might
create, in effect, a safe harbor for baseless civil RICO actions
within the federal court system.
2.

The "Extension of Civil RICO" Argument

Under Rule 11, the presentation of a claim is proper if it represents a "good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."'75 Given RICO's breadth and liberal judicial construction, it is evident that the "extension" clause is particularly prone to abuse. In O'Malley, the plaintiff alleged four counts
of obstruction of justice,76 and although obstruction of justice is
expressly limited to federal court proceedings, the plaintiff argued
for its extension to state courts and administrative hearings based
on a broad reading of RICO. 77 In response, the O'Malley court
characterized this argument as a "lame attempt" to fit within Rule
71 See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709. Based on its reference to the plaintiff's civil RICO
action as "baseless" and "outrageous," it is apparent that the district court in O'Malley
found the complaint to be objectively frivolous. See id. at 705, 709.
7-2852 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
73 Id. at 208. In Beeman, the district court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint
failed to state a cause of action under civil RICO. Id. In a memorandum opinion, the trial
court noted that the "'plaintiff ha[d] not alleged an enterprise ... [nor] a pattern of racketeering.... [nor] predicate acts."' Id. The court summed up its view by stating that "[tihe
complaint is really nothing other than a nightmare." Id. (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 212. Despite the obvious frivolity of the claim, both the district and appellate
courts rejected as inappropriate the defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Id.
75 FED. R. Crv. P. 11; supra notes 1 & 52 and accompanying text; see also Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) ("good faith belief in the merit of a
legal argument is an objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after 'reasonable inquiry' ").
7' See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 707-08.
77 See id.
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11's extension clause. 78

A proposal for the modification of the existing "two predicate
acts" requirement under civil RICO was advanced in Calica v. Independent Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. 79 The Calica court expressly
acknowledged that the complaint directly contravened the current
state of the law within the Second Circuit, yet declined to impose
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.80 Because the argument to modify
the core elements of a civil RICO claim was objectively unreasonable in view of the statute's express mandate and existing precedent, it would seem that, based on the position of the Second Circuit in O'Malley, the commencement of the action in Calica
warranted Rule 11 sanctions.
3. The "Improper" Civil RICO Claim
If a meritless claim is asserted for "any improper purpose,"
Rule 11 sanctions are in order. 81 Civil RICO claims are extremely
susceptible to the impropriety embraced within this Rule 11 clause
since, by their very nature, they invoke both economic and social
concerns, including the possibility of complicated and expensive legal proceedings and the fear of being labeled a "racketeer."s 2 As a
result of the solicitude they instill in defendants, civil RICO claims
serve as powerful strategic litigation devices 3 and are, therefore,
often improperly "bootstrapped" onto complaints to increase costs,
delay proceedings, and coerce settlements.8 4
78 Id. at 708. The O'Malley court acknowledged that the Supreme Court encouraged a
broad interpretation of the statute, yet declined to "go so far as to abrogate the plain meaning of the statute." Id.
79 RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH)
7325 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1989). In Calica, the
plaintiff acknowledged that the established law within the Second Circuit required at least
two predicate acts of racketeering to state a cause of action under RICO. Id.
80

See id.

8,FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 195-96 (discussion of
improper purpose clause).
82 See DuVal, supra note 12, at 311. A RICO cause of action is considered a "powerful
weapon in terms of both monetary and reputational damage," id. at 342, since it "instills
fear in many defense-oriented civil litigators" and consistently "provokes controversy." Id.
at 292. Moreover, the issues involved in a RICO action are perplexing to jurors. See id. at
340.
83See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A defendant in a civil
RICO action faces "tremendous financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labeled
a 'racketeer.'" Id. As a result, RICO defendants would rather settle the dispute than face
the embarrassment of such a social stigma. Id. See generally P. BATISTA, supra note 4, passim (discussing offensive strategies of civil racketeering litigation).
84 See, e.g., Chapman & Cole v. Itel Containers Int'l, 865 F.2d 676, 684-85 (5th Cir.)
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In light of the many improper motives for bringing such actions, civil RICO complaints are deserving of prudent judicial review at the district court level. As demonstrated in O'Malley, an
objective analysis of the surrounding circumstances may uncover
the impropriety of a private RICO action.8 5 In O'Malley, the plaintiff's persistence regarding his RICO claim, even after being advised of its obvious fallaciousness at a pre-trial hearing, was, in the
opinion of the reviewing court, an indication of bad faith and
vexatiousness. 6
Several federal courts, in defiance of Rule l's mandate, have
failed to penalize civil RICO actions of obvious impropriety.8 7 For
example, in Beeman, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions despite a finding that the lawsuit "was brought in retaliation for some bareknuckle union infighting.""" Similarly, in Mortell v. Mortell Co.,s9 the Seventh Circuit declined to order Rule 11 sanctions in a civil RICO action
notwithstanding its depiction of the case as a "weak grudge litigation." 0 Since Rule l's "improper" clause was designed to prevent
abusive and harassing lawyering of this type, it is suggested that
the presence of any improper purpose underlying a civil RICO
(RICO counterclaim used as part of defensive strategy to increase litigation costs in hopes of
plaintiff's withdrawal), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (RICO wrongfully used for "extortive purposes" resulting in perpetuation of "evils that it was designed to combat").
8"See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709. Although an "improper purpose" necessarily involves
a subjective element, courts are discouraged from delving into a party's subjective state. See
Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 195; see also Beeman, 852 F.2d at 209 (improper purpose should
be determined from examination of records and circumstances surrounding case); Brown v.
Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986) (test of improper
purpose similar to standard used to judge frivolousness in that both are objective).
88 See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709. In O'Malley, the plaintiff was given advice to withdraw his baseless RICO complaint early in the action and was warned that Rule 11 sanctions would be pursued if the RICO claim were not withdrawn. Id. Although it was not
within the power of the reviewing court to make a factual finding as to the improper purpose of plaintiff's RICO claim, the court inferred bad faith based on an objective view of the
circumstances. Id.
87 See infra notes 88-91 & accompanying text (decisions denying Rule 11 sanctions despite finding of improper purpose).
88See Beeman, 852 F.2d at 208 (quoting Beeman v. Fiester, No. 86C-3861 (N.D. Ill.
July 21, 1987)). The district court characterized the plaintiff's complaint as "a good oldfashioned local union fight" and a "paroxysm of RICO rage." Id. (quoting Beeman v. Fiester, No. 86C-3831, mem. op. at 1, 2 (N.D. iM., Feb. 6, 1987)).
88 887 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1337. Despite the Mortell court's characterization of the plaintiff's civil RICO
claim as "conspicuously deficient" in all respects, it had no power to order Rule 11 sanctions
sua sponte. Id. at 1327-28.

1990]

CIVIL RICO RACKET

claim, even in connection with an otherwise meritorious cause of
action, is in strict violation of Rule 11. 91
IV.

CURBING CiviL RICO WITH "APPROPRIATE SkNCTIONS"

Rule 11 affords federal district courts wide discretion in fashioning an "appropriate" sanction in the event of a Rule 11 violation.2 In view of the high stakes involved in a frivolous civil RICO
claim, courts should tailor the specific sanction in accordance with
the severity and nature of the violation. 93 In many cases, the imposition of compensatory sanctions alone may not effectively discourage litigants from bringing baseless RICO claims.94 By adopting a
discretionary "double-sanction" approach for clearly meritless civil
.1 Cf. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (left question
open whether RICO claim sanctionable if well grounded in fact and law but filed solely for
improper purpose). But see Carlton v. Jolly, 125 F.R.D. 423, 427-28 (E.D. Va. 1989) (found
Rule 11 sanctions inappropriate where RICO claim was grounded in fact and law but
brought solely for improper purpose), aff'd sub nom. Carlton v. Franklin, 911 F.2d 721 (4th
Cir. 1990).
92 See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709; Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d
243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("district court has tasted the flavor of the
litigation and is in the best position" to select sanction).
The ability to determine sanctions is not within the power of the reviewing appellate
court. See O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 709 ("appellate court is ill-suited for the delicate, factintensive analysis and judgment needed to fashion a proper sanction").
District courts may choose from a wide array of appropriate sanctions. See Schwarzer,
supra note 3, at 200-04. Some courts have determined "appropriate" sanctions to include
not only the costs and expenses involved in the litigation, but also sanctions characterized as
punitive in nature. See, e.g., Burger v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 684 F. Supp.
46, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ($2,500 punitive damages plus expenditures in connection with unnecessary reply brief); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.,
108 F.R.D. 96, 106 (D.N.J. 1985) ($5,000 sanction to vindicate dignity of judicial process).
93 See Rule 11 advisory committee note, supra note 2, at 200. "[I]n considering the
nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take account of the
state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other
paper was signed." Id. Courts should also considir other mitigating factors, including, inter
alia, "the seriousness of the violation . . . [and] the appropriateness of punishment." C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 42, at 109 (footnotes omitted).
94 See Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 n.5 (D. Colo. 1984). The Saine court
emphasized that frivolous RICO complaints should be met with appropriately severe
sanctions:
A RICO defendant also needs to be protected from unscrupulous claimants lured
by the prospect of treble damages, and it should be the policy of the law, within
Irresponthe procedural constraints of our system, to provide this protection ....
sible or inadequately considered [civil RICO] allegations should be met with severe sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
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RICO claims, district courts could further the primary objectives
of Rule 11, and at the same time, provide adequate protection for
the defendants of such inappropriate actions.9 5 It is proposed that
this method, implemented by awarding twice the amount of actual
litigation costs, would serve to fully compensate the party offended
by the claim, effectively punish the principal offender, and deter
future frivolous RICO actions in fulfillment of Rule 11's goals. e In
addition, it is encouraged that courts adhere to the plain language
of amended Rule 11 and initiate their sanctioning power sua
97
sponte in order to deter future violations of the rule.
Although it is customary judicial practice to do otherwise, it is
further advised that courts sanction on the record;98 a published
order would serve as a permanent record of the extent of the
courts' sanctioning powers under Rule 11.1 Moreover, an on-therecord sanction would give proper notice to potential litigants of
the severe consequences involved in pursuing frivolous civil RICO
actions.1 00
Although Rule 11 sanctions are unpleasant for all parties involved, their imposition is encouraged to guard the judicial system
against abusive civil RICO litigation.0 " Increasing the frequency
See Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 881 (suggesting revision of § 1964(c) incorporating
Rule 11 cautionary language and calling for double damage penalty); cf. Goldsmith & Keith,
supra note 20, at 103 (proposing discretionary award of treble attorney's fees to litigants
defending baseless RICO suits).
See Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 181 (N.D. Mo. 1984).
7 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1336, at 101; see also Sanko S.S. Co. v.
Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987) (as long as due process afforded, judge entitled to raise
issue of Rule 11 and award sanctions on own motion).
08 See Lewin, supra note 2, at col. 1. Recent statistics have shown that courts frequently impose Rule 11 sanctions without writing opinions. Id. Consequently, it is estimated
that many more Rule 11 cases have been decided than actually appear in the official reporters. Id.
" See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 199.
'00 Id. A written opinion addressing the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions serves several
important functions. Id. In particular, a public record of sanctions "enhances the deterrent
effect of the ruling." Id. Furthermore, written opinions provide the added benefit of establishing standards for determining actionable conduct. See generally Cavanagh, supra note 3,
at 536-46 (suggesting necessity of clear standards for Rule 11 determination).
101 See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 205. Judge Schwarzer emphasized the critical role
that Rule 11 sanctions play in the litigation process:
Of all the duties of the judge, imposing sanctions on lawyers is perhaps the most
unpleasant. A desire to avoid doing so is understandable. But if judges turn from
Rule 11 and let it fall into disuse, the message to those inclined to abuse or misuse
the litigation process will be clear. Misconduct, once tolerated, will breed more
misconduct and those who might seek relief against abuse will instead resort to it
in self-defense.
95
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and severity of Rule 11 sanctions in civil RICO litigation will not
stifle creative advocacy under RICO, nor will it judicially abrogate
the private RICO cause of action. 10 2 It is suggested that a more
assertive application of the federal courts' sanctioning power would
curb the endless mass of civil RICO pleadings, and weed out only
improper claims. If adequately implemented and in accordance
with the approach set forth herein, it is asserted that Rule 11 can
effectively deter frivolous civil RICO claimants from having their
day in court, while retaining a private RICO cause of action for
those truly deserving of its rich remedy.
CONCLUSION

Frivolous RICO claims constitute a needless waste of judicial
resources by cluttering the federal courts with meritless and unnecessary litigation. This Note has suggested that courts need not
be blinded by the complexity or unsettled nature of civil RICO in
lieu of their obligations under amended Rule 11. To prevent the
federal judiciary from becoming a mere sanctuary for baseless private RICO claims, courts must abide by the mandatory nature of
Rule 11. Accordingly, courts are encouraged to impose appropriately severe sanctions when confronted with civil RICO claims that
are clearly violative of Rule 11. In sum, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides an effective and efficient method of judicial
gatekeeping and is ideally suited to fight off the recurring abuses of
civil RICO in the federal courts.
Petra J. Rodrigues

Id.; see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (issue of sanctions
"distasteful" but necessary), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
102 See Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 20, at 103. Since Rule 11 sanctions are imposed

against frivolous claimants only, and not those who have failed on the merits, such sanctions
"will not serve as an in terrorem deterrent to RICO litigation generally." Id. The imposition
of enhanced sanctions would effectively serve to protect the remedial purposes of civil RICO
and render its abuse "a statutory nullity." Id.

